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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Manuel Lozano’s partner, Diana Montoya Alvarez, took their
daughter from London and never returned.1 Lozano finally found them in
New York over a year later and filed a Petition for Return of Child under
both the Hague Convention (“the Convention”) and the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), which were both created to deter
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, Incoming Note & Comment Editor, Volume 27,
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, B.A. American
History, Franklin Pierce University. Supremely grateful for my fantastic editors and
publication team. Endlessly thankful for my parents, David Michael Erler and Joan Belle
Erler, for their constant love and support throughout my academic career. Finally, huge
thanks to my faculty advisor Professor Rick Wilson for his wisdom and guidance.
1. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (alleging that
Lozano was physically and emotionally abusive to Montoya Alvarez and possibly to the
child as well).
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parents from abducting their children on an international level.2
When Lozano located his wife and daughter over sixteen months later, his
petition to have his daughter returned to the United Kingdom was denied
because she was “now-settled” in New York.3 The court also declined to
extend the petition’s one-year filing period, even though the respondent
concealed the child.4 Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court
affirmed.5
In court, Montoya Alvarez relied on the “grave risk” defense and the
“now-settled defense.”6 To satisfy the “grave risk” defense, the respondent
needed to prove that returning her daughter to the U.K. would expose the
child to harm or otherwise place her in an intolerable situation.7 The district
court found that the evidence did not support a grave risk defense and only
considered the now-settled defense.8 To satisfy this defense, the respondent
must prove that it is in the child’s best interest to remain in his/her new
environment where he/she has become settled after more than one year.9
The court determined that Lozano’s daughter became settled in New York
during the time that she was concealed.10 The court declined to extend the
one-year filing deadline to account for the months in which the child was
2. See generally Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S Treaty Doc. No-99-11 [hereinafter
Hague Convention]; International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001-
9011 (2014); Laurie L. Trotter, Comment, The Hague Convention Two Decades Later:
Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 6 GONZ.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2002-2003) (describing the relationship between the Hague Convention
and its implementing legislation in the United States (ICARA)).
3. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 228 (explaining that removal may harm a
child if he or she becomes settled in their new environment).
4. See id. at 228-29 (holding that equitable tolling will not be applied to the one-
year filing period).
5. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S.Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014) (affirming that
equitable tolling will not be applied to the Hague Convention).
6. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (noting that affirmative defenses may
only be raised after one year).
7. See id. (clarifying that the respondent must establish the grave risk defense by
clear and convincing evidence).
8. See id. at 225 (finding that the respondent had failed to establish clear and
convincing evidence that returning to the U.K. would place the child at a grave risk of
harm).
9. See id. at 226 (discussing the Convention’s rationale in setting the one-year
threshold).
10. See id. at 234 (holding that the child had reached the point where she had become
so settled in her new environment that repatriation would not be in her best interest).
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concealed while also acknowledging that refusing to extend the deadline
seemed inconsistent with the Convention goals.11
Lozano appealed twice, ultimately losing his case before the Supreme
Court of the United States.12 The Supreme Court’s decision in Lozanomeant
that equitable tolling would not be applied to the one-year filing deadline
stipulated in the Convention and ICARA, regardless of whether an abducting
parent conceals a child.13 By denying Lozano’s petition, the Court ignored
facts that pointed to Lozano’s extensive efforts to locate his child, and that
Lozano’s petition merely sought to compel Montoya Alvarez and their
daughter to return to the U.K. for custody evaluations.14
This Comment argues that refusing to apply equitable tolling to ICARA’s
one year filing period is an unconstitutional violation of a custodial parent’s
due process rights because it hinders custodial parents from utilizing the
statutory processes afforded to them under ICARA when their children are
abducted/removed from the country; additionally, it deprives custodial
parents of their fundamental right to raise their children.15 Part II describes
the creation of ICARA and the Convention, and how equitable tolling has
been applied to ICARA.16 Part II further explains how equitable tolling is a
matter of procedural due process, and how parental rights are protected as
fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.17 Part III asserts that
equitably tolling ICARA is necessary to protect custodial parents’ procedural
and substantive due process rights, and that judicial discretion is not an
adequate substitute.18 Part IV recommends overturning Lozano and applying
11. See id. at 228 (acknowledging that refusing to apply equitable tolling to the
deadline could encourage abducting parents to hide their children long enough for them
to become settled).
12. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014) (concluding that
the Court of Appeals had rightly decided that the Hague Convention was not subject to
equitable tolling).
13. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1236 (holding that the Convention drafters did not
intend to apply equitable tolling). Note that for the purposes of this Comment, it is
assumed that the substantive due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment extend to non-US citizens.
14. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 225 (referencing a doctor’s testimony stating
that returning to the U.K. would not result in trauma or bring about a grave risk of harm).
15. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (establishing that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
16. See infra Part II (documenting the origins of ICARA and how courts have
applied or declined to apply equitable tolling to the statute).
17. See id. (detailing how U.S. courts have protected parental rights).
18. See infra Part III (asserting that equitably tolling ICARA will allow courts to
properly protect custodial parents’ due process rights).
3
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equitable tolling to ICARA.19 Part V concludes by reiterating that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Lozano v Montoya Alvarez constitutes an
unconstitutional violation of procedural and substantive due process and
should be overturned in favor of equitable tolling in cases of child
concealment.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. International Child Abduction Laws
1. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction
According to the Department of Justice, more than three-fourths of all
child abductions are committed by a family member.21 With the rise of
international marriages, language barriers and foreign legal systems have
created hurdles for parents attempting to reclaim their abducted children.22
The creation of the Convention allowed courts to address the extreme
difficulty parents face in regaining custody of their abducted children
internationally.23 Each state that ratifies the Convention is required to
establish a central authority designed to locate abducted children and secure
their return.24 For the U.S., this is the Department of State.25
To file a petition for the return of one’s child, the Convention requires the
19. See infra Part IV (arguing that the Supreme Court should overturn their ruling in
Lozano and allow equitable tolling to be applied to ICARA’s one-year filing period).
20. See infra Part V (concluding that equitably tolling ICARA is a legitimate solution
to protecting custodial parents’ fundamental right to parent, as well as their due process
rights).
21. See Blake Sherer, Comment, The Maturation of International Child Abduction
Law: From the Hague Convention to the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act, 26 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 137, 138 (2013) (referencing data from 1999 that analyzed child
abductions on an international level).
22. See Dana R. Rivers, Comment, The Hague International Child Abduction
Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act: Closing Doors to the
Parent Abductor, 2 TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 591, 639 (1989) (noting that it is difficult to
obtain effective assistance from foreign authorities without proper international
legislation).
23. See Sherer, supra note 21, at 147 (noting that the U.S. ratified the Convention in
1988 by passing ICARA).
24. SeeW. A. Stranko, International Child Abduction Remedies, 1993 ARMY L. 28,
28 (1993) (explaining that central authorities further Convention goals on a state level).
25. See id. at 29 (establishing the United States federal government as an enforcer of
the Convention).
4
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following: (1) the child must be taken to a state which has ratified the
Convention, (2) the child must be under age sixteen, (3) the child must have
crossed an international border, and (4) the petition must be filed with the
central authority of the state where the abducted child has been taken.26
Once the Department of State receives a petition, it has an obligation to
take every appropriate measure dictated by Convention guidelines.27 These
measures, however, have a time limit; courts have a legal obligation to return
an abducted child, but it is only triggered if a custodial parent files a petition
within one year of the child’s removal.28 Under Convention guidelines, a
court may decline the return order if an abducted child has become settled in
her new environment.29 Once a year has passed, an abducting parent may
raise a now-settled defense to prevent the child from being returned under
court order.30
Judicial discretion determines whether a child is returned after a year has
passed.31 Convention guidelines allow judges to examine the facts of each
case to determine whether granting the petition would be in a child’s best
interest.32 This discretion is allowed because once a year has passed, a
court’s absolute obligation to return an abducted child to their home state
becomes a permissive obligation dependent on the particular circumstances
of the case.33
26. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 9 (clarifying that ICARA applies only to abduction
cases rather than custody issues, thus barring courts from ruling on non-jurisdictional
matters).
27. See id. (articulating that the Department of State has a duty to initiate
administrative proceedings and ensure a child’s safe return should voluntary return
negotiations fail).
28. See id. (emphasizing the difference between an absolute and permissive
obligation; once a year has passed, the return obligation becomes permissive and up to
judicial discretion).
29. See id. (explaining how judicial discretion is used to look after a child’s best
interests).
30. See id. (addressing the “now settled” affirmative defense, which relies on a child
becoming settled within their new environment once a year has passed).
31. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014) (noting that
judicial discretion was used to determine that Lozano’s daughter had become settled in
New York).
32. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 8 (noting how the Convention responsibilities shift
once one year has passed).
33. See id. (noting that after the one-year deadline, courts may use their discretion to
consider affirmative defenses raised by respondents, who must provide clear and
convincing evidence to support their claims).
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2. International Child Abduction Remedies Act
When incorporating the Convention, the U.S. did more than establish the
Department of State as a central authority; it also established the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).34 ICARA
acknowledges the Convention as a sound framework to help resolve the issue
of international child abduction.35 ICARA ensures that Convention terms
are smoothly implemented by resolving jurisdictional, evidentiary, and
privacy issues particular to the U.S. legal systems.36 Its purpose is to better
serve Convention goals by expediting rulings and emphasizing quick turn-
around times for U.S. petitions.37
ICARA and the Convention are nearly identical but for a few additional
conditions found in ICARA.38 In addition to the Convention’s filing
requirements, ICARA specifies that an English version be included in all
foreign correspondence related to the Convention and clarifies that the U.S.
government will not assume any costs associated with returning an abducted
child.39
B. Equitable Tolling and ICARA
Prior to Lozano, multiple U.S. courts applied equitable tolling to the one-
year filing deadline in cases where an abducting parent has concealed the
location of the child.40 In Furnes v. Reeves, the Eleventh Circuit became the
34. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (2014)
(clarifying that the provisions in ICARA were intended to supplement, rather than
replace, Convention provisions).
35. See id. (acknowledging that international agreement is necessary to effectively
combat the issue of child abductions).
36. See Stranko, supra note 24, at 31 (noting that this was a rare example of the
United States taking steps to make matters less complicated and more uniform).
37. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining that ICARA’s goal is to serve the
Convention’s purpose of deterring international child abductions by expediting rulings
in U.S. courts).
38. See id. at 5-6 (noting that language and financial conditions were added when
ICARA was codified).
39. See id. (adding that such costs may include legal fees and court costs related to
bringing litigation within the United States).
40. See, e.g., Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging
that both the Convention and ICARA are silent as to whether equitable tolling should be
applied to the one-year filing period). But c.f. Lynn D.Wardle, Is the Now Settled Defense
to a Hague Abduction Convention Claim for Return of a Child Subject to Equitable
Tolling – Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 41 A.B.A. PREVIEWU.S. SUP. CT. CASES 139, 142
(2013) (noting that while the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits allow equitable tolling
of the “now settled” defense, the First and Second Circuits rejected it).
6
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first circuit to decide that equitable tolling was applicable under ICARA.41
The Furnes court adopted the reasoning in Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch,
where the court held that equitable tolling applied to ICARA petitions
because failing to apply it would otherwise reward an abducting parent for
concealing their children for one year.42
In Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, the mother unlawfully removed her
two minor children without her husband’s consent on January 19, 2000.43
The petitioning father filed a missing person report two days later and began
his own investigation.44 Three months later, he learned that his family was
in Florida.45
The court in Mendez Lynch noted that the father did not file the petition
until more than a year after the mother wrongfully removed the children.46
However, the court also noted that in this case equitable tolling would apply
until July 6, 2000, as this was the deadline the State Department gave the
mother to decide whether to voluntarily return the child.47 The father had
filed the petition in a timely fashion and the mother could not raise an
affirmative defense.48 The court stated that there was no indication Congress
intended to preclude equitable tolling from ICARA’s one-year filing
41. See generally Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1362-63 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(adopting the district court’s reasoning in Mendez Lynch that equitable tolling could
apply in ICARA cases where the abducting parent has concealed the child’s location).
42. See Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63 (reasoning that equitable tolling
should be read into every federal statute of limitations unless Congress states otherwise).
C.f. Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 16, 19 (2013) (asserting a court’s discretion even if a
child is already settled in their new environment).
43. See Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (rejecting the notion that the removal
was a “vacation”).
44. See id. at 1352 (noting that the petitioner revoked his written permission for his
children to travel without his presence).
45. See id. at 1354 (adding that a pastor told the petitioner his family was somewhere
in Florida just before April 2, 2000).
46. See id. at 1362 (noting that the petition was also not filed within one year of the
wrongful retention date, which was March 7, 2000).
47. See id. at 1363 (emphasizing that the respondent had taken active and consistent
steps to prevent contact between the petitioner and his children until November of 2000).
Contra Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (clarifying that a
risk of harm to the child remains even where the petitioner has a good reason for not
filing sooner).
48. See Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (concluding that the children were
not well-settled in Florida because they had lived in seven different locations within one
year).
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deadline.49 It pointed out that refusing to apply equitable tolling would
reward abducting parents for concealing their children and allow parents to
assert affirmative defenses that would be otherwise unavailable.50
Similarly, the court in Furnes v. Reeves equitably tolled the one-year
limitation period until the petitioner located his missing daughter.51 Like the
court in Mendez Lynch, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that equitable
tolling could apply to ICARA petitions when the abducting parent has
concealed the child.52
When it decided Lozano, the trial court acknowledged that its refusal to
apply equitable tolling went against prior district court decisions.53 It based
its holding onMatovski v. Matovski, which emphasized that because parents
could still file petitions after one year, the filing period is not a one-year
statute of limitations.54 However, the courts inMatovski and Lozano did not
consider that rejecting equitable tolling creates a one-year statute of
limitations that opens the door for parents to raise a now-settled defense
while infringing on the co-parent’s substantive and procedural due process
rights.55
49. See id. at 1362 (acknowledging that the Eleventh Circuit noted the similarities
between this one-year period and a statute of limitations but was silent on whether
equitable tolling applied to ICARA); see also Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir.
1998) (agreeing that the one-year filing period was analogous to a statute of limitations).
50. See Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (noting that the respondent took
several intentional steps to conceal her children, while the petitioner sought to resolve
the issue without resorting to Convention proceedings).
51. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that Furnes’
daughter was removed in the summer of 2001, but no petition was filed until November
of 2002).
52. See id. (citing Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002)) (reasoning that
equitable tolling should apply to limitation periods unless it would be inconsistent with
the statute’s text). Contra Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2013) (reasoning
that if the drafters of the Convention had meant for the one-year period to start once the
petitioner knew the child’s location, they would have said so).
53. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (acknowledging
that only a few other courts reject equitable tolling on the basis that the one-year period
is not a statute of limitations).
54. See id.; see also Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06 Civ. 4259(PKC), 2007 WL
2600862, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (stating that the now-settled defense recognizes
that after one year, it may not be in the child’s best interest to be removed from their
environment).
55. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 2004) (arguing that equitable
tolling should apply to limitation periods unless it would be inconsistent with a statutes’
text).
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C. Equitable Tolling as a Due Process Requirement
Courts find equitable tolling necessary to meet certain constitutional due
process requirements.56 The issue is determining when exactly this process
is due and under what circumstances.57 The Supreme Court noted in
Mathews v. Eldridge that due process is a flexible concept with procedural
protections largely determined by the demands of specific situations.58 Three
factors determine when a specific process is due: (1) the presence of a private
interest that will be affected by official action, (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of this interest through the current procedures used, and (3) the
probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards and
governmental interest in the matter.59
Procedural due process such as equitable tolling protects individuals by
imposing constraints on governmental decisions that deprive individuals of
liberty or property interests.60 As such, the Court in Mathews found that
procedure must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who
are to be heard to ensure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to
present their case.61 The Court’s concern was satisfying a fundamental
requirement of due process by giving individuals the opportunity to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.62
A state’s power to regulate the procedures under which its laws are carried
out are only limited by the Due Process Clause when the procedure offends
some principle of justice “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.”63 The Supreme Court subjected the
56. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (establishing that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
57. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 633 (2010) (holding that equitable tolling
is not warranted in a statutory matter when there is only a “garden variety claim of
excusable neglect”).
58. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (adding that due process
must flexibly address each case’s circumstances).
59. See id. at 335, 340 (using these factors to hold that the Due Process Clause does
not require an evidentiary hearing prior to terminating Social Security disability benefit
payments).
60. See id. at 332 (adding that these interests must fall within the meaning of the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
61. See id. at 349 (defending an individual’s right to have their case heard in a U.S.
court of law).
62. See id. at 333 (emphasizing the timeliness of hearing cases and the availability
of courts).
63. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977) (holding that placing
the burden of proving an affirmative defense by preponderance of the evidence on the
defendant does not violate due process).
9
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) to this concept
in Holland v. Florida, incorporating equitable tolling into the federal statute
despite governmental protests.64 The Court disagreed with the state’s
argument that equitable tolling undermined the statute’s basic purpose of
eliminating delays in the review process, since prior law determined
timeliness under equitable principles.65 The Court declined to interpret the
statute’s silence on equitable tolling as “congressional intent to close
courthouse doors that a strong equitable claim would keep open,” and held
that a petitioner is qualified to equitable tolling if he shows: (1) that he has
been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstances stood in his way and prevented a timely filing.66
Though it is a federal statute, equitable tolling is not currently read into
ICARA.67 However, ICARA is “designed to honor the international
philosophy of the Convention without violating U.S. constitutional standards
of due process.”68 Since ICARA is considered a domestic American law, a
parent must receive due process and a fair opportunity to be heard by a
court.69 To be heard in a U.S. court, a custodial parent must submit a petition
in English to the Department of State, in which they must also prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the abducting parent wrongfully took the
child.70 Likewise, proving an exception to ICARA, such as the now-settled
defense, only requires a preponderance of the evidence on the part of the
64. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010) (allowing equitable tolling of
AEDPA under extraordinary circumstance that amounted to more than mere excusable
negligence).
65. See id. at 646-48 (noting that a non-jurisdictional statute of limitations is subject
to a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling).
66. See id. at 649 (looking beyond the exact text and reading equitable tolling into
the statute as a matter of American custom).
67. See Dorothy Carol Daigle, Due Process Rights of Parents and Children in
International Child Abductions: An Examination of the Hague Convention and its
Exceptions, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865, 882-83 (1993) (noting that Convention
proceedings do not guarantee a custody hearing which satisfies due process); Nicole
Fontaine, Don’t Stop the Clock: Why Equitable Tolling Should Not Be Read into the
Hauge Convention on International Child Abduction, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2091, 2105-06
(2013) (finding a “lack of support for equitable tolling in the text and drafting history of
the Convention and ICARA).
68. See Rivers, supra note 22, at 638 (speculating that judicial discretion could pose
a risk to the effectiveness of ICARA if statutory exceptions become too widespread).
69. See Daigle, supra note 67, at 893 (adding that a custodial parent has a right to be
heard before they lose custody of their child).
70. See Rivers, supra note 22, at 634-35 (noting that once a petition is submitted, the
respondent must receive notice).
10
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respondent.71
D. Parental Rights and Substantive Due Process
The U.S. Supreme Court affords great deference to parental rights.72 In
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court emphasized that parents have a substantive
right to raise their children.73 Furthermore, the Court stated that parents have
a natural duty to give their children a suitable education.74 The Court in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters reinforced this opinion when it held that a statute
mandating children to attend public schools unreasonably interfered with the
liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children.75
The Fourteenth Amendment grants parents the freedom to retain custody
of their children, as well as to nurture and care for them, although not without
limits.76 In Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, the Court deemed child rearing to
be a fundamental right that falls under one’s guaranteed right to privacy.77
The Court further stated in Wisconsin v. Yoder that Western civilization
71. See id. at 636-37 (emphasizing that the “now settled” defense can be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence, while the grave risk defense must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence).
72. See Christopher Klicka, [italics] Decisions of the United States Supreme Court
Upholding Parental Rights as "Fundamental," HOME SCH. LEGALDEF. ASS'N: CURRENT
ISSUE ANALYSIS (Oct. 27, 2003), https://hslda.org/content/docs/nche/000000/
00000075.asp (elaborating that the Supreme Court “has unwaveringly given parental
rights the highest respect and protection possible.”); see, e.g. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 390 (1923) (holding that a statute barring the teaching of foreign languages in
schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
73. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (acknowledging that the right of parents to educate
their children falls within the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (affirmingMeyer’s holding that
parents have a right to control their children’s religious upbringing and education).
74. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400 (noting that parents had a right to ask the plaintiff to
instruct their children in a foreign language, and thus the plaintiff had a right to teach it).
75. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (stating that parents have both
the right and duty to prepare their children to survive in society); see generally Farrington
v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927) (barring a statute eliminating private schools
because it would unreasonably restrict a parent’s ability to direct their child’s education).
76. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (clarifying that this right
is not beyond government regulation in the public interest).
77. See Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (elaborating that
privacy rights also extend to matters of family and marriage); see also Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 603-06 (1979) (addressing a parent’s right to make decisions regarding
their child’s mental health and stating that the notion that governmental power should
supersede parental authority in all cases of parental neglect or abuse goes against
American tradition).
11
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traditionally supported parental concern for the upbringing of their children,
and parents play a primary role in a child’s upbringing.78 The Court in Carey
v. Population Services International clarified that an individual may make
personal decisions relating to marriage and family relationships barring a
compelling government interest.79
The Court spoke further on matters of child custody in Santosky v.
Kramer, holding that parental rights are fundamental and specially protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment.80 The Court distinguished these decisions
in Lehr v. Robertson, where the Court ruled against a birth father’s rights on
the basis that he did not have a sufficient custodial, personal, or financial
relationship with his child.81 Meanwhile, the Court strengthened parental
rights in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, reasoning that because most
minors lacked fundamental rights of their own, parents who possess such
rights must use them in their child’s best interests.82 Finally, in Troxel v.
Granville, the Court established a strict scrutiny test and held that the
government cannot infringe on parents’ rights to control their children’s
upbringing unless the government uses the least restrictive means to achieve
a compelling government interest, validating its previous holdings that
parental rights are worthy of substantial protections.83
78. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) (upholding the right to
homeschool children and emphasizing that it is not enough that the regulation is
reasonable; the government must have a compelling interest in order to obstruct such a
right).
79. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (requiring
regulations to be narrowly drawn to address compelling state interests).
80. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981)) (holding that termination procedures regarding
parental rights must satisfy Due Process Clause requisites, regardless of whether an
individual has been a model parent or has temporarily lost custody of their child to the
state).
81. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 268 (1983) (holding that parental rights are
coupled with parental duties to prepare their children for societal obligations and that
carrying out those duties affords a parent constitutional protections).
82. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (acknowledging
that children are subject to the control of their parents, even regarding their physical
freedom).
83. See, e.g. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (blocking a Washington
statute that allowed courts to order visitation rights for any person when it could serve
the best interests of a child and supporting precedent that granted due process protection
to parental rights); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978)
(holding that under strict scrutiny government practices restricting fundamental rights
are “justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if
no less restrictive alternative is available.”).
12
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol26/iss2/5
2018] FAR FROMNOW-SETTLED 805
III. ANALYSIS
A. ICARA Should be Subject to Equitable Tolling Even if it is Not Applied
to the Hague Convention Because it is a Federal Statute Subject to U.S.
Law and Customs Which Protect Individuals’ Substantive and Procedural
Due Process Rights
1. ICARA as a Federal Statute was Created to Comply with U.S. Law and
Customs84
ICARA should be subject to equitable tolling because it is a federal statute
that must satisfy constitutional due process requirements.85 When abducting
parents conceal their children to wait out the filing deadline and raise
affirmative defenses, the non-abducting custodial parent is robbed of the
opportunity to be heard by the court in a timely manner and further denied
fundamental parental rights when courts decline to apply equitable tolling.86
To satisfy due process requirements, courts must consider ICARA’s one-
year filing period to be a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling in
cases of concealment.87
Courts decline to apply equitable tolling to the one-year filing period
because equitable tolling is not generally assumed to apply to conventions.88
84. For the purposes of this analysis, it is interesting to note that not once in its
reasoning against equitable tolling did the Supreme Court mention the long-standing
precedent set inMurray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804),
which states that “An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other construction remains . . . further than is warranted by the law of
nations as understood in the United States.” If the Court truly believed that equitable
tolling would violate the Hague Convention, an international treaty, then the Charming
Betsy case should have been the first one they referenced rather than falling back on
vague concepts of “American historical tradition.”
85. See Rivers, supra note 22, at 638 (noting that ICARA is designed to honor the
international philosophy of the Convention without violating U.S. constitutional
standards of due process).
86. See id. (cautioning courts about allowing exemptions such as the “now settled”
defense to lessen ICARA’s effectiveness).
87. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (highlighting the Supreme
Court’s focus on satisfying a fundamental requirement of due process by giving
individuals the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner); see, e.g., Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691, 701 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying
this reasoning to concealment of tax fraud and stating that “as a general rule, . . . a statute
of limitations is tolled by a defendant’s fraudulent concealment . . . because it would be
inequitable to allow a defendant to use a statute intended as a device of fairness to
perpetrate a fraud”).
88. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1232 (2014) (detailing their
13
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The court in Yaman examined Article 12 of the Convention and, though
equitable tolling was not mentioned, the court stated that the text “suggested”
that equitable tolling did not apply.89 The court would ultimately find
equitable tolling not just inapplicable, but unnecessary as applied to the
Convention.90
By extension, since ICARA is implementing legislation for the Hague
Convention, courts that oppose equitable tolling assert that equitable tolling
should not be read into ICARA either.91 This instinct to pair ICARA with
the Convention speaks to courts’ tendencies to view the Convention and
ICARA as indistinguishable.92 Anti-equitable tolling courts, such as those
in Yaman and Lozano, further argue that if equitable tolling were applied to
ICARA but not the Convention, the uniformity sought through ICARA
would be undermined.93
This view fails to take into account that while the Convention and ICARA
are extremely similar, they are not identical because ICARA contains
conditions that differentiate it from the Convention, which were added
before ICARA was codified into U.S. law.94 These conditions show that
ICARA is its own federal statute, and should thus be treated as such by the
U.S. legal system.95
Anti-equitable tolling cases like Yaman rely far too heavily on the explicit
text of the Convention, rather than properly treating ICARA as a federal
refusal to apply equitable tolling the Convention’s one-year filing period).
89. See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting passages of
Article 12 to note that The Convention does not mention the date a child’s location is
discovered and instead relies on the date the child is removed or abducted).
90. See id. at 13 (stating that Article 12 already provides a mechanism to prevent
misconduct form being rewarded in the form of judicial discretion).
91. See id. (declining to view the one-year filing period as a statute of limitations,
which are traditionally subject to equitable tolling in federal statutes); see also Lozano,
134 S. Ct. 1236 (declining to recognize equitable tolling as a viable tool in ICARA cases
since it was not mentioned by the drafters of the Convention).
92. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that while ICARA and the Convention are
nearly identical, conditions regarding the language of documents and litigation costs
were added to ICARA, distinguishing it as an independent piece of legislation).
93. See Stranko, supra note 24, at 31 (noting that ICARA’s uniformity keeps parents
from abusing the system after abducting their children, as it does away with the
possibility of dealing with fifty different state statutes).
94. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 5-6. (identifying the differences between ICARA
and the Hague Convention that establish ICARA as its own federal statute).
95. See id. at 11 (explaining that ICARA’s goal is to expedite rulings to better serve
the goals of the Hague Convention).
14
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statute subject to U.S. customs and traditions.96 The Supreme Court has
previously declined to interpret a federal statute’s silence on equitable tolling
as “congressional intent to close courthouse doors that a strong equitable
claimwould keep open.”97 The Hague Convention neither allows nor forbids
equitable tolling, so allowing equitable tolling aligns with the decision in
Furnes v. Reeves, which reasons that equitable tolling should apply to
limitation periods unless it would be inconsistent with the text of the relevant
statute.98 In Holland v. Florida, the Court held that equitable tolling could
be applied to a statute of limitations if a petitioner diligently pursued her
rights and if some extraordinary circumstances prevented her from filing her
petition in a timely fashion.99
ICARA’s one-year filing period is essentially a statute of limitations and
should be equitably tolled as per American legal custom.100 In 2002, the
court in Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch found that equitable tolling should
be read into every federal statute of limitations unless Congress states
otherwise.101 The Supreme Court reiterated this concept in 2010 when it
noted that non-jurisdictional statutes of limitations are subject to a rebuttable
presumption in favor of equitable tolling, reinforcing the idea that the
availability of equitable tolling is not limited to a statute’s explicit text.102
Four years prior toMendez Lynch, the Eleventh Circuit analogized ICARA’s
one-year filing period to a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling,
96. See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 112-13 (2013) (considering the drafting
history of the Hague Convention rather than examining ICARA as it fits into the U.S.
legal system, including the conditions added to it before its codification).
97. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (allowing equitable tolling of
a federal statute under extraordinary circumstances that amounted to more than excusable
negligence).
98. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 722 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Young v. United
States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (applying equitable tolling in cases of intentional
concealment).
99. See id. (applying equitable tolling as per American custom even though the
statute never explicitly mentions it).
100. See generally Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363
(M.D. Fla. 2002) (recognizing the one-year filing period as a statute of limitations subject
to equitable tolling).
101. See id. (invoking equitable tolling to extend the one-year filing period in a
Convention abduction case where the abducting parent conceals the child from the
petitioner).
102. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 631-32 (2010) (stating that equitable
tolling would not impact the timeliness of court decisions because timeliness has always
been determined under equitable principles).
15
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though it did not make a definitive decision.103 ICARA is a federal statute,
so its one-year filing period should be treated as a statute of limitations that
should have equitable tolling automatically read into it.104
The Supreme Court in Lozano justified its refusal to apply equitable
tolling to ICARA by differentiating ICARA from other federal statutes,
largely on the basis that ICARA was created solely to implement a pre-
existing international convention.105 The Court reasoned that implementing
legislation of an international convention does not share the same historical
background as a federal statute passed independently in the United States.106
As such, it would be inappropriate to apply such historical principles to
ICARA because it is a statute passed as implementing legislation for a
foreign convention.107
Furthermore, the Supreme Court justified its decision in Lozano by
declining to view ICARA’s one-year filing period as a statute of
limitations.108 Traditional historical principles of American law illuminate
how statutes of limitations are treated within federal law: while statutes of
limitations exist to prevent individuals from raising stale claims, U.S. legal
custom recognizes the need to equitably toll these limitations when certain
circumstances arise.109 By refusing to recognize ICARA’s one-year filing
period as a statute of limitations, the Court was able to dismiss Lozano’s
assertion that American courts could apply their own “common law doctrine
of equitable tolling” to the Convention’s one-year filing period.110
103. See Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (disagreeing
with the Eleventh Circuit’s notation in Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir. 1998)
that may have allowed the one-year filing period to be considered a statute of limitations).
104. ContraAnderson, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 875 (citing the remaining potential for harm
to a child as a reason for disagreeing with the decisions in Lops andMendez Lynch).
105. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1232 (2014) (reasoning that
implementing legislation of a foreign treaty is not the same as an independent federal
statute passed by Congress because it is not rooted in the same historic principles and
traditions).
106. See id. (elaborating that Congress is assumed to incorporate equitable tolling into
federal statutes of limitations because it is a traditional part of American law).
107. See id. (adding that it would be equally inappropriate to apply traditional
American legal principles to the Hague Convention itself).
108. See id. at 1234 (declining to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s view that ICARA’s
one-year filing deadline could be analogous to a statute of limitations because parents
are can still file a petition after one year has passed).
109. See Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008) (highlighting the need
for equitable tolling in cases where a parent has concealed their child to wait out the one-
year filing deadline and gain the ability to raise affirmative defenses).
110. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014) (noting that the
16
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Viewing ICARA more as an extension of the Hague Convention, rather
than an independent federal statute, directly effects petitioners’ procedural
due process rights.111 Like many courts, the Supreme Court apparently
considers ICARA and the Convention to be interchangeable.112 The
petitioner in Lozano failed to identify historical acceptance or instances of
equitable tolling practiced by other signatories of the Hague Convention, a
fact which the Court used to conclude that equitable tolling was not meant
to apply to the Convention or its implementing legislation.113
The Supreme Court dismissed the fact that ICARA is a federal statute
passed by Congress, viewing it instead as implementing legislation requiring
a specific mention of equitable tolling for tolling to apply.114 This double
standard— requiring equitable tolling to be explicitly stated in ICARAwhen
it is presumed to apply to most other federal statutes — is apparently
necessary for courts to ensure a uniform international interpretation of the
Convention amongst signatory states.115 Congress passed ICARA to ensure
uniformity amongst the fifty states utilizing the same guidelines as other
countries participating in the Convention.116 Because the drafters of the
Convention neglected to include equitable tolling in Article 12, the Court
reasoned, allowing equitable tolling to be applied to ICARA would be
inconsistent.117
Hague Convention allows states to use additional sources of law to help secure the return
of abducted children, but refusing to recognize equitable tolling as a viable tool in
ICARA cases since it was not mentioned by the drafters of the Convention).
111. See id. at 1229 (relying heavily on the text of the Hague Convention when faced
with an ICARA case, reasoning that ICARA was created as implementing legislation for
the Convention).
112. See id. (noting that ICARA instructs courts to decide international child
abduction cases in accordance with the Hague Convention).
113. See id. at 1233 (adding that the petitioner conceded that no foreign courts had
adopted equitable tolling because these courts lacked the same historic customs
principles as the United States).
114. See id. (adding that ICARA is not meant to alter the Convention, and that ICARA
provisions are in addition to rather than in lieu of provisions found in the Hague
Convention).
115. See id. at 1233-34 (explaining that Congress did not attribute the same historical
principles of American law to ICARA simply by enacting it as a federal statute).
116. See Stranko, supra note 24, at 31 (enumerating the benefits of implementing
legislation, including uniformity amongst state governments in the United States).
117. See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 13 (2013) (examining the drafting history of
the Convention and noting that equitable tolling, while present in the Preliminary Draft
Convention, was left out of the Convention to eliminate the difficulty of determining the
date the child’s location was discovered and establish a minimum time period for the
“now settled” defense”).
17
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This justification fails to acknowledge that absolute uniformity is neither
practical, nor generally practiced, regarding international treaties and
domestic implementing legislation, and that Congress added certain
conditions to ICARA before passing it into law.118 Furthermore, ICARA’s
provisions are meant to be read as additions to the Convention rather than
replacements for any existing guidelines.119 The provisions exist to ensure
that ICARA can coexist amongst other federal statutes and satisfy
constitutional due process requirements.120 If petitioners must meet certain
standards set by ICARA to have their case heard in an American court, those
courts must afford petitioners all the constitutional protections due to them,
including access to a fair and timely trial.121
A glaring issue with the Supreme Court’s argument that ICARA cannot
be modified beyond the text of the Convention is that Congress made
modifications to ICARA before it was codified into U.S. law.122
Modifications to the Convention were necessary to make matters dealing
with language barriers and government costs conform more closely to
American legal practices.123 The addition of such conditions clearly conflicts
with the Court’s stance that no modifications or reservations can be added to
ICARA due to uniformity concerns.124 The very practice of drafting
implementing legislation for international treaties affords Congress the right
to add provisions that better suit the U.S. legal system with certain historical
118. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 5-6 (noting the existence of additional conditions in
ICARA, despite the Court’s stance that they cannot modify or add conditions to
implementing legislation).
119. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (2014)
(clarifying that the provisions in ICARAwere in addition to and not in lieu of Convention
provisions, reinforcing the concept of uniformity).
120. See Rivers, supra note 22, at 638 (acknowledging ICARA as an independent
federal statute meant to reflect the philosophy of the Hague Convention while ensuring
that petitioners in American courts receive constitutional protections).
121. See id. at 635 (noting that ICARA requires petitioners to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a child has been wrongfully taken for a court to hear
the petition).
122. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014) (declaring that
the Court could only apply equitable tolling to the Hague Convention if Convention
drafters intended to include equitable tolling and holding that the drafters did not intend
to include equitable tolling in the Convention or, by extension, ICARA).
123. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 5-6 (illustrating how the United States slightly
altered ICARA to better suit its own legal system before Congress codified it).
124. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1233 (stating that it would be inappropriate for
American historical values to be read into either ICARA or the Hague Convention
because such values were not considered when the Convention was drafted).
18
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principles in mind.125 Further, Congress’s implementing additional
conditions in ICARA shows that requiring equitable tolling is certainly
feasible, as well as necessary and appropriate to achieve ICARA’s legislative
and policy objectives.126
The Supreme Court’s holding in Lozano undermines the policy rationale
behind ICARA.127 When ICARA was first implemented, the Department of
State questioned the propriety of rewarding abductors for concealing their
children and saw ICARA as a way to prevent this result from occurring.128
Similarly, courts in Mendez Lynch and Belay v. Getachew recognized the
importance of using ICARA to further the Convention’s objective to provide
a mechanism for parents to legally bring about the return of their abducted
children. 129 These courts also saw equitable tolling as a logical and
necessary tool to prevent an abducting parent from being rewarded for
concealing a child to defeat a court order through the now-settled defense.130
Concealment of an abducted child works directly against the expediency
sought in ICARA proceedings, as it deliberately delays the filing process in
an effort to pass the one-year filing deadline and open up the possibility of
raising affirmative defenses.131 Once that year passes, judges are granted the
125. See id. at 1233 (revisiting the Supreme Court’s reference to the historical
principles found in federal statutes).
126. See Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008) (articulating the
concern shared by pro-equitable tolling courts about rewarding abducting parents for
abusing the constraints of ICARA and the Hague Convention by concealing their
children).
127. See Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,505 (Mar. 26, 1986) (acknowledging the implementation of
ICARA into U.S. law as a domestic means to help combat international child abduction).
128. See Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570 (quoting Hague International Child Abduction
Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,505) (Mar. 26, 1986)) (noting the questionable
propriety of rewarding parents for concealing their children because it goes directly
against the Hague Convention’s main goal of preventing child abductions).
129. See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363 (M.D. Fla.
2002) (noting that the respondent raised the now-settled defense after deliberately
concealing her children’s location from the petitioner); see also Belay v. Getachew, 272
F. Supp. 2d 553, 565 (D. Md. 2003) (concluding that the abducting parent would not be
allowed to benefit from the “protective sweep” of Article 12 and rejected her now-settled
defense because she had concealed her child’s whereabouts from the petitioner).
130. See Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (detailing respondent’s efforts to
conceal her children from the petitioner during the one-year period); see also Belay, 272
F. Supp. 2d at 564 (noting that the respondent purposefully withheld information
regarding the child’s location, and witnesses refused to inform the petitioner of his
child’s whereabouts).
131. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 20 (addressing the now-settled affirmative defense
19
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discretion to return a child to the abducting parent, thereby complicating an
otherwise simple filing process with deliberation of fact and weighing of a
parent’s legal rights versus their child’s best interests.132 This confusion and
discretion often unjustly rewards the abductor for concealing his or her
child.133 Even if courts cannot apply equitable tolling to the Convention
itself, the courts may apply equitable tolling to ICARA, which is a codified
federal statute with its own goals and underlying purpose.134
2. Equitably Tolling ICARA is Necessary to Comply with Procedural Due
Process Requirements
Equitable tolling is necessary to satisfy due process requirements in
ICARA cases involving child concealment because it satisfies the factors set
forth by the Supreme Court inMathews v. Eldridge.135 The first factor is the
presence of a private interest that will be affected by official action, which
in this case is a parent’s ability to exercise the fundamental right to raise their
children.136 Petitioners who bring ICARA petitions before American courts
are seeking to obtain their abducted children from the United States in order
to resume their custodial duties and responsibilities.137 Furthermore,
petitioners in American courts have an interest in pursuing legal claims in a
fair and timely manner.138 Without applying equitable tolling to ICARA’s
one-year filing period, petitioners who do not learn the location of their
children until after a year has passed do not benefit from a court with an
aised by abducting parents once a year has passed since the initial abduction).
132. See id. (explaining that after one year, the obligation to return a child to the non-
abducting parent becomes permissive rather than absolute and is left up to judicial
discretion).
133. See Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d at 570 (2008) (quoting Hague International
Child Abduction Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,505 (Mar. 26, 1986)) (questioning
the propriety of awarding abductors for concealing their children in order to make
affirmative defenses available after the one-year filing deadline has passed).
134. See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1347 (M.D. Fla.
2002) (reasoning that equitable tolling should be read into every federal statute of
limitations unless Congress states otherwise).
135. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (elaborating that when all
three factors are present, an individual is due a specific process).
136. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (holding that child
rearing is a fundamental right that falls under one’s guaranteed right to privacy).
137. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (stating that parental rights are
coupled with parental duties that must be carried out to have Constitutional protection).
138. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348 (holding that procedure must be tailored to the
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard, to ensure that they are given
a meaningful opportunity to present their case).
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absolute requirement to return the child to their home state, and must instead
depend on judicial discretion.139
The second factor that must be satisfied under theMathews standard is the
risk of erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the current
procedures used by the government.140 The outcome of an ICARA trial
determines whether the petitioner’s child is returned to their home state, or
whether the child remains in the country in which they have been
concealed.141 If the respondent conceals the child for over a year and raises
a successful now-settled defense, the petitioner is further deprived of their
ability to exercise the parental rights guaranteed to them under the
Fourteenth Amendment.142
ICARA’s one-year filing period must be considered a statute of limitations
in order to properly address the concerns raised in this second factor.143 Due
process exists to impose constraints on governmental decisions which
deprive individuals of liberty or property interests, and failing to view the
one-year deadline as a statute of limitations ignores the reality that after one
year petitioners lose the right to an absolute return of their child.144 While
the court may still grant petitions after one year, it also has the discretion to
deny the petition if the respondent raises a successful affirmative defense
such as a now-settled defense.145 Thus, a petitioner’s fundamental parental
139. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that once a year has passed, a court’s return
obligation becomes permissive and allows the respondent to raise affirmative defenses).
140. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220
F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (noting that after a year passed, the respondent
was able to raise a now-settled defense after concealing her child until the one-year filing
period passed).
141. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the
child will remain in NewYork with the respondent even though the respondent concealed
the child for over sixteen months).
142. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 390 (1923) (acknowledging that the
Supreme Court has recognized parental rights as fundamental and worthy of
constitutional protection).
143. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (stating that procedural due process must be
tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard by the court and
to ensure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case).
144. See id. at 332 (adding that these interests must fall within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause); see also Trotter, supra note 2, at 21 (noting that an absolute return
obligation only exists if a petitioner files their petition with the proper central authority
within one year of the child’s abduction).
145. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 234 (holding that petitioner’s child had
become so settled in New York that repatriation to the U.K. would not be in her best
interest and acknowledging that accepting this now-settled defense meant ignoring the
petitioner’s parental rights).
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rights are at the mercy of broad judicial discretion due to circumstances
outside of his control.146
A further concern addressed by this second factor is that ICARA only
requires respondents to prove by preponderance of the evidence that a child
is settled.147 In comparison, the grave risk defense must be proved with clear
and convincing evidence, a much higher threshold than the now-settled
defense.148 The court in Lozano granted the respondent’s now-settled
defense on the basis that the child had developed ties to her new community,
even though those ties were developed while the child was deliberately
concealed from the petitioner.149
The benefits of applying equitable tolling to ICARA address the third
Mathews factor, which examines the probable value of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards as well as governmental interest in the
matter.150 Equitably tolling the one-year filing deadline in cases of
intentional concealment would further ICARA’s and the Convention’s goal
of deterring international child abductions by removing parents’ incentive to
hide their children overseas.151 Furthermore, allowing equitable tolling
would limit respondents’ ability to raise affirmative defenses which would,
in turn, limit the uncertainty that accompanies judicial discretion.152
The government’s interests in maintaining the current system — namely,
146. See Daigle, supra note 67, at 894 (cautioning courts to exercise their discretion
to ensure that individuals receive their constitutionally-protected human rights and
individual freedoms); see also Rivers, supra note 22, at 638 (emphasizing that ICARA’s
effectiveness will depend largely on how courts apply exceptions and affirmative
defenses to the facts of each case and cautioning the widespread use of affirmative
defenses).
147. See Rivers, supra note 22, at 636-37 (noting that this is the same standard a
petitioner must reach to prove that a child was wrongfully taken).
148. See id. at 637 (noting that the standard of evidence for some affirmative defenses,
such as the now-settled defense, was lowered).
149. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (using judicial
discretion to determine that the child was now settled in New York and it would be
against her best interests to return her to her home state).
150. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 335 (1976); see also In re Lozano, 809
F. Supp. 2d at 228 (acknowledging that the lack of equitable tolling may encourage
abducting parents to hide their children long enough for them to become settled).
151. See Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (2008) (voicing Congress’ own
concerns about rewarding parents for abducting their children).
152. See Rivers, supra note 22, at 620-21 (addressing the concern that judicial
discretion can lead to uncertainty and injustice if not kept in check); see also Stranko,
supra note 24, at 31 (discussing the uniformity ICARA seeks to achieve to keep parents
from abusing the system by moving their children around to different signatory states).
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a need for uniformity and the concern for children’s best interests — are not
compelling enough to justify infringing on petitioner’s constitutional
rights.153 Equitable tolling will increase uniformity among ICARA cases by
decreasing the usage of judicial discretion and limiting the exceptions that a
respondent can raise if they deliberately conceal their child.154 Regulations
that allow for such broad judicial discretion are not narrowly drawn enough
to justify depriving petitioners of their fundamental rights to raise their
children, particularly when concealment does not prevent a court from
granting a now settled defense.155
Equitable tolling in cases of intentional concealment for ICARA cases
meets all three factors laid out in the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews
v. Eldridge.156 As such, refusing to apply equitable tolling to ICARA is an
unconstitutional violation of procedural due process that robs petitioners of
their guaranteed rights and freedoms.157
Equitable tolling should also be available in ICARA cases where
petitioners meet the additional due process factors laid out by the Supreme
Court in Holland v. Florida.158 In Lozano, Mendez Lynch, and Furnes the
petitioners exhausted countless avenues of relief as they searched for their
children, while the abducting parents took measures to conceal the
children.159 These efforts satisfy the first factor put forth by the Supreme
153. See Klicka, supra note 72 (concluding that parental liberty is to be protected by
the highest standard of review: the compelling interest test).
154. See Belay v. Getachew, 272 F.Supp.2d 553, 565 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that the
respondent may not benefit from the “protective sweep” of the now-settled defense
because the respondent deliberately concealed the child’s location from the petitioner).
155. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (requiring
regulations to be narrowly drawn to address compelling state interests).
156. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (viewing due process as a
flexible concept whose protections are largely determined by the demands of specific
situations).
157. See id. at 332 (adding that these rights and freedoms are limited to those
contemplated by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
158. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 631 (2010) (allowing equitable tolling of
AEDPA under extraordinary circumstance that amounted to more than a petitioner’s
excusable negligence).
159. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that
Lozano exhausted all resources in the United Kingdom before beginning his search in
the United States); Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363 (M.D.
Fla. 2002) (noting that the respondent took several intentional steps to conceal her
children’s whereabouts, while the petitioner had sought to resolve the issue outside of
Convention proceedings); Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 708 (11th Cir. 2004)
(equitably tolling the one-year deadline until the petitioner actually found his child,
whom the respondent kept concealed during the petitioner’s search).
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Court in Holland: the petitioner must diligently pursue her rights in order for
equitable tolling to apply.160 This factor aligns with the holding in Belay v.
Getachew that differentiates between cases in which a custodial parent has
not filed a timely petition due to negligence and cases in which an abducted
child has been intentionally concealed for the sake of raising affirmative
defenses.161
Intentionally concealing an abducted child satisfies Holland’s second
factor: the presence of some extraordinary circumstances that prevented her
from filing a timely petition.162 The petitioners inMendez Lynch and Furnes
diligently pursued their rights, and would have likely filed their petitions in
a timely manner if they had known the location of their children.163 In those
cases, the respondents deliberately concealed their children’s locations in an
effort to keep the petitioners from taking effective legal action, thereby
acting directly in opposition to the goals of ICARA and the Convention.164
In both cases, respondents were assisted by individuals who withheld
information and helped conceal the child’s location, further hindering the
petitioner’s efforts to locate his child before the deadline expired.165
In cases where a respondent has intentionally concealed her child for over
a year in order to raise a now settled defense, both of the Supreme Court
factors laid out in Holland v. Florida are sufficiently met to establish a right
to due process.166 Though equitable tolling is not explicitly mentioned in
160. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 632 (allowing equitable tolling to be considered on a
case-by-case base).
161. See Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d 553, 565 (D. Md. 2003) (differentiating
between cases where an abducted child has been concealed and cases where a parent has
neglected to file a petition in time despite knowing their child’s location).
162. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 644 (noting that negligence or inadequate counsel do
not qualify as extraordinary circumstances).
163. See Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (emphasizing that the respondent
took active and consistent steps to prevent contact between the petitioner and his children
and noting that the petitioner had previously revoked permission for his children to travel
without his presence); Furnes, 362 F.3d. at 708 (noting that the respondent concealed the
child from the summer of 2001 to July of the next year).
164. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (justifying its
refusal to apply equitable tolling by assuming the drafters of the Hague Convention
favored a child’s best interests over the risk of encouraging abductions).
165. See id. at 211 (noting that the respondent had been staying with her sister in New
York while concealing her child); Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 (noting that
witnesses refused to inform the petitioner of his child’s whereabouts and that a pastor
had finally told the petitioner his family was somewhere in Florida).
166. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 632 (allowing equitable tolling to be considered due
process even if it not explicitly mentioned in the statute if both factors are met).
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ICARA or the Convention, Supreme Court precedent deems it appropriate
to consider equitable tolling due process, the denial of which is an
unconstitutional violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.167
3. Equitably Tolling ICARA is Necessary to Satisfy Strict Scrutiny and
Protect Custodial Parents’ Substantive Due Process Right
The government’s interest in protecting children’s best interests is not a
sufficiently compelling reason to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, nor is
the Court’s reliance on the exact text of the Convention narrowly drawn
enough to address the government’s concern.168 In its refusal to apply
equitable tolling to ICARA’s filing period, the Supreme Court in Lozano
stated that an abducted child’s best interests could be overlooked if equitable
tolling were to be applied in all cases of concealment.169 The Court adopted
this reasoning even though the Convention and ICARA’s ultimate purpose
is purportedly to prevent international child abduction by deterring would-
be abductors from taking their children across national borders.170 The Court
claims that equitable tolling actually undermines the purpose of the
Convention, relying on its absence within the Convention’s text as evidence
that it was not meant to apply.171
Court decisions in Lozano and other anti-equitable tolling cases favor one
of the Convention’s objectives – the rights of the child – over the equally
important objective of protecting parental and substantive rights.172 Further,
167. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (allowing for flexibility
when determining due process because due process is closely dependent upon time,
place, and circumstances).
168. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 678 (1977) (requiring
regulations to be narrowly drawn to address compelling state interests); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (noting that the government must have a
compelling interest to obstruct a parent’s right to raise their children).
169. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1235 (2014) (rejecting
Lozano’s argument that equitable tolling is consistent with the purpose of the Hague
Convention to prevent child abductions).
170. See id. (agreeing that the Hague Convention reflects a design to discourage
international child abductions but adds that this is not a goal to be pursued at any cost,
particularly if that cost is a child’s best interests).
171. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1235; see also Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 13-14
(1st Cir. 2013) (reasoning that if Convention drafters had meant for the deadline to begin
when the parent learned of their child’s whereabouts, they would have put such language
within the Convention, and noting that the current language exists to establish a
minimum time limit for a child to become settled within their new environment).
172. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1234-35 (first quoting Hague Convention, Arts 12-13
supra note 2; then quoting In re M, [2008] 1 A.C. 1288, 1310 (Eng. 2007) (opinion of
Baroness Hale of Richmond)) (concluding that children "should not be made to suffer
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courts such as those in Yaman and Anderson appear to claim that the
potential disregard of one’s parental and substantive rights is a risk worth
taking since equitable tolling may not ultimately prevent parents from
concealing their children.173 The parental rights of the petitioner in these
cases are rarely mentioned in detail, and are often dismissed after a brief
acknowledgement.174
Additionally, courts citing a child’s best interests as a compelling state
interest ignore that the abducting parent was unilaterally making a decision
about a child’s interests, which violates the other parent’s constitutional right
to be a part of such decisions.175 In cases where both parents have custody
of a child, it is the responsibility of both parents to act in a way that is best
for the child’s personal interests.176 While custody matters are outside
ICARA’s scope, matters of substantive due process rights, such as a parent’s
right to raise their child, are meant to be strongly protected within the
American legal system.177 Furthermore, by refusing to apply equitable
tolling to ICARA’s one-year filing period, courts deny petitioners their
procedural due process right to properly bring their case before an American
court and reclaim their parental rights.178
As a whole, courts that oppose equitable tolling offer the same
hypothetical solution: judicial discretion.179 Suddenly, a risk that was too
for the sake of general deterrence of the evil of child abduction world wide," and refusing
to apply equitable tolling to the Convention's one-year filing period).
173. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1236 (listing alternatives that the Court deems suitable
to prevent concealment and noting that concealment can sometimes prevent a child from
becoming truly settled).
174. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (presuming that the
child’s best interests were to be considered of higher importance than the risk of
encouraging abductions).
175. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (acknowledging that
children are subject to the control of their parents, even regarding their physical
freedom).
176. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 707 (11th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that parents
are meant to act in the child’s best interest when making decisions for the child in
personal matters).
177. See Stranko, supra note 24, at 31 (noting that ICARA is meant to simplify
jurisdictional issues for international Convention cases and indicating that the United
States can only debate custody issues if a grave risk of harm defense is successfully
raised).
178. SeeMathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (noting that the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner is a fundamental
requirement of procedural due process).
179. See, e.g., Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining that
permissive discretion could still be used even if a child has become settled).
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great — the possibility that a court may act against a child’s best interest —
is not too large a hurdle to overcome if it is left to a court’s individual
discretion rather than legislation.180 Viewing deliberate concealment of a
child as just one factor a court will weigh leaves too much to judicial
discretion and results in less predictability and consistency regarding what
rights ICARA will afford parents.181
Furthermore, it is insufficient to simply offer “discretion” as a viable and
equal alternative to equitable tolling.182 The Court in Lozano reasoned that
parents would already be deterred from concealing their children because
concealment “sometimes” prevents a child from becoming settled in the first
place, undermining a potential affirmative defense.183 Rather, the Court
suggests, lower courts will be able to properly examine the facts and decide
whether or not a child has truly become settled during their concealment.184
Such a viewmakes an odd distinction between abductors who successfully
settled their children while actively concealing them and those who were
unable to simultaneously settle and conceal their children.185 In practice,
parents who successfully conceal their children will benefit from a now-
settled defense, while those that are unable to settle their children will not.186
By refusing to treat ICARA like any other federal statute by incorporating
equitable tolling, courts are violating petitioners’ substantive and procedural
due process rights by failing to offer alternatives to equitable tolling that
180. See id. (elaborating that no matter how settled a child is, after one year a court
has the permissive discretion to return the child to their home state).
181. See id. at 19 (listing concealment as a negative factor when considering a now-
settled defense).
182. See id. at 13 (asserting that parents still have access to due process because the
passage of a year does not prevent them from filing a return petition).
183. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014) (listing
alternatives to equitable tolling that the Court deems suitable to prevent parents from
concealing their children); see alsoWigley v. Hares, 82 So.3d 932, 942 (Fla. App. 2011)
(determining that the now-settled defense could not be raised where the abducting parent
purposely kept the child out of community activities, sports, and church to keep him
concealed).
184. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1231 (noting that the child was settled due to evidence
of stability in her family, education, social, and home life during her concealment in New
York).
185. See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363 (M.D. Fla.
2002) (finding that the abducted children were not well-settled in Florida since they had
lived in seven different locations within one year).
186. See generally Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 2004) (allowing
the one-year filing period deadline to be equitably tolled until the date that the petitioner
actually learned of his child’s location after she had been concealed).
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protect petitioners’ rights to raise their children.187 Without a compelling
government interest, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lozano defies their
own precedent which grants ample protection to parental rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and fails to properly serve the goals of ICARA and
the Convention.188
Furthermore, refusing to apply equitable tolling to ICARA’s one-year
filing period violates procedural due process in a manner that does not satisfy
the strict scrutiny requirement articulated in Wisconsin v. Yoder.189 In
Parham v. J.R., the court found that governmental power superseding
parental authority in all cases goes against American tradition.190 In ICARA
cases where the child has been concealed and the one-year filing deadline
has passed, the court exercises its governmental power through discretion.191
This discretion usurps the parental authority of petitioners who are now
vulnerable to losing their rights if the respondent raises a successful
affirmative defense.192 Such broad discretion is not narrowly drawn enough
to satisfy the legal requirements of a strict scrutiny standard, nor has any
compelling government interest been properly articulated that would warrant
denying petitioners their substantive and procedural due process rights.193
B. Refusing to Apply Equitable Tolling to Lozano’s ICARA Petition was
an Unconstitutional Violation of Substantive and Procedural Due Process
The Supreme Court’s refusal to equitably toll the one-year filing period in
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez was an unconstitutional violation of the
187. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1236 (asserting that the exercise of judicial discretion
in cases of concealment is an adequate alternative to equitable tolling).
188. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing that parental
rights are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment).
189. SeeWisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (requiring the government to
explicitly name a compelling interest for obstructing a constitutional right and clarifying
that the mere reasonableness of a regulation does not satisfy this requirement).
190. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604-06 (1979) (addressing a parent’s right to
make decisions regarding their children’s mental health).
191. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014) (asserting that the
exercise of judicial discretion in cases of concealment is an adequate alternative to
equitable tolling).
192. See Trotter, supra note 2, at 8 (addressing the now-settled affirmative defense
raised by abducting parents once a year has passed since the initial abduction).
193. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (holding that governmental interference in children’s
education violates parents’ substantive rights because it unconstitutionally infringes on
a parent’s right to raise their child and make decisions regarding their education); see
also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (requiring regulations to
be narrowly drawn to address compelling state interests).
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petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process
rights.194 Lozano filed his petition under both the Convention and its
implementing legislation, ICARA.195 As a petitioner in the American legal
system, Lozano had a right to constitutional due process protections,
including the application of equitable tolling.196 Failing to equitably toll
ICARA unjustly severs a petitioner’s parental rights and should be subjected
to the compelling interest test established in Yoder to evaluate whether
obstructing a parent’s right to raise their child is constitutional.197 Under this
test, the government’s interest in protecting a child’s best interests is not
sufficiently compelling to warrant disregarding Lozano’s fundamental
parental rights, nor is the current system narrowly drawn enough to achieve
this purpose.198
The fact that the Convention found it reasonable to set a firm one-year
filing deadline is not sufficient to satisfy due process because Wisconsin v.
Yoder demands that the government must have a compelling interest in order
to obstruct a parent’s right to raise their children.199 In Lozano, the
government has failed to identify a compelling state interest, such as a public
safety risk, that would arise from allowing equitable tolling.200 As such,
Lozano’s parental rights must be protected as per the precedent set forth by
the Supreme Court in Yoder.201
194. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (establishing that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court has recognized certain
liberties protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, including parental rights).
195. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (2014)
(clarifying that the provisions in ICARA were in addition to and not in lieu of the
provisions of the Convention).
196. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (noting that due process is
meant to be flexible to accommodate the different circumstances presented in each case).
197. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (noting that having a reasonable regulation does not
satisfy constitutional requirements when addressing the infringement of fundamental
rights).
198. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (acknowledging
that protecting a child’s best interest by rejecting equitable tolling seems to go against
the government’s interest in furthering the goals of the Hague Convention and preventing
international child abductions).
199. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (emphasizing that it is not enough that the regulation
is reasonable).
200. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (discussing the affirmative defense that
addresses public safety risks, the grave risk of harm defense, which prevents children
from being exposed to physical or psychological harm).
201. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 (emphasizing the importance of parental concern for
the upbringing of their children and defending a parent’s right to play a primary role in
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Denying Lozano an opportunity to raise his daughter was a serious
violation of substantive due process, because Lozano’s petition was denied
due to circumstances manufactured by the respondent that allowed her to
raise a successful affirmative defense.202 In Lozano, the Court showed
insufficient regard for Lozano’s fundamental right to raise his daughter.203
Manuel Lozano would not likely be considered a model father; the
respondent alleged that their child was traumatized by her time living with
the petitioner.204 However, because the court determined that there was no
grave risk of harm present due to lack of evidence, such allegations cannot
be considered in determining the child’s best interests.205 Additionally,
ICARA and the Convention deal solely with jurisdictional issues rather than
custody issues themselves, thus anything other than a grave risk of harm
cannot be considered when U.S. courts hear ICARA petitions.206
Due Process Clause requirements must be met even in cases in which an
individual has not been a model parent.207 Refusing to equitably toll the one-
year filing period for Lozano’s petition deprived him of his parental rights
just as surely as would allowing his daughter to remain in a location where
Lozano has no input regarding her upbringing.208 For more than two years,
Lozano was denied any say in where his child was raised, where she was
educated, and what medical choices were made for her.209 Fundamental
her child’s upbringing).
202. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (noting that due process is
meant to impose constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of
liberty or property interests); see also Pierce v. Soc’ of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (ruling against a statute that unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children).
203. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34 (stating that public safety can outweigh the rights
of parents to claim control over their children).
204. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 208-09 (alleging that petitioner was
physically and emotionally abusive to respondent and possibly to the child as well).
205. See id. at 225 (finding that respondent failed to establish evidence that the child
would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise intolerable situations
if she returned to the United Kingdom).
206. See Stranko, supra note 24, at 31 (noting that ICARA was implemented in the
United States to, in part, simplify jurisdictional issues for international Convention
cases).
207. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981)) (holding that termination procedures regarding
parental rights have to satisfied Due Process Clause requisites, even in cases when an
individual has not been a model parent).
208. See Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (2002) (considering the legal
and custodial rights of the petitioner).
209. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (explaining that petitioner exhausted
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parental rights include the right to control a child’s upbringing, including the
child’s health and education.210 While concealing their child in New York,
the respondent enrolled the child in a new school and took the child to a
therapist and a doctor.211 At the same time, the respondent concealed the
child’s location from Lozano and neither informed him about nor sought his
advice or approval regarding their child’s education and health.212 With
every one of these independent decisions, the respondent further trampled
upon Lozano’s fundamental right to have a say in his child’s upbringing, and
the respondent was rewarded for this behavior when the court granted her
affirmative defense.213
Lozano was entitled to constitutional protection of his parental rights
because he had a significant custodial, personal, and financial relationship
with his daughter prior to the abduction.214 The Supreme Court has held that
the constitutional protection afforded to a parent is directly connected to that
parent’s duties to their child.215 For a parent’s rights to be protected, she
must have some significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with
her child.216 Lozano played a significant role in his daughter’s life; he lived
in the same apartment as the respondent and child, he worked two jobs to
support his family, and he exhausted all avenues in attempting to locate his
daughter after she was abducted.217 Under the standard articulated in Lehr,
all resources in the United Kingdom before beginning his search in the United States).
210. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (including control over
education and religious upbringing among parental rights); see also Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 604-06 (1979) (addressing a parent’s right to make medical decisions regarding
their children’s health).
211. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 224-25 (referring to a therapist’s testimony
regarding the likely source of the child’s trauma, and a doctor’s testimony that returning
to the United Kingdom would not result in trauma).
212. See id. at 228, 234 (finding that the respondent deliberately concealed the child’s
location from the petitioner, and that during the sixteen months of concealment the child
became settled in New York).
213. See Rivers, supra note 22 at 638 (remarking that ICARA’s effectiveness at
deterring international child abductions will depend largely on how courts use their
discretion to apply exceptions such as the now-settled affirmative defense).
214. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (noting that Lozano and the respondent
lived together with their child as a family unit despite apparent marital discord).
215. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (holding that parental rights are
directly correlated with parental duties that are meant to prepare their children for future
societal obligations).
216. See id. at 258-59 (holding that a biological father without any prior relationship
to his child did not possess any parental rights protected by the Constitution since he
failed to act on his parental duties).
217. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11 (explaining that after the respondent
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retention of parental rights is contingent on the exercise of and participation
in parental duties.218 Accordingly, Lozano should be afforded his
constitutionally-protected parental rights, which should in turn be protected
by procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.219 This
procedural due process, which must be imposed to protect Lozano’s liberty
regarding his parental rights, must take the form of equitable tolling.
The court in Lozano acknowledged that accepting a now settled defense
meant ignoring the petitioner’s parental rights in favor of the child’s best
interests.220 However, in exercising its discretion, the court ignored clearly
articulated Supreme Court precedent that recognizes a parent’s general right
to determine his or her child’s best interests.221 Further, when the Court
rejected the respondent’s grave risk of harm affirmative defense, it also
removed any legal basis under ICARA for giving the respondent the
unilateral power to determine their child’s best interest.222 By still granting
the respondent’s now-settled defense, Lozano was denied his procedural due
process rights, as well as his right to act in the best interest of his child’s
limited rights.223
Generally, the Fourteenth Amendment grants parents the right to retain
custody of their children in the absence of a court order or state interest.224
Neither a respondent nor a court addressing an ICARA petition has the
authority to deny a petitioner their custody rights.225 The right to raise one’s
and child disappeared, the petitioner went to the police and attempted to locate them
using the U.K.’s legal system before filing his petition through both ICARA and the
Hague Convention once he had finally located them in the United States).
218. See Lehr, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (articulating the standard for protection of parental
rights)
219. See id. at 258 (discussing the relationship between parental rights and parental
duties; the protection of the former was deemed to be contingent upon the exercise of the
latter).
220. See In re Lozano, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 234 (holding that petitioner’s child had
become so settled in New York that repatriation to the U.K. would not be in her best
interest).
221. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (stating that parents
must use their parental rights to further their child’s best interests).
222. See id. (acknowledging that children are subject to the control of their parents,
even regarding their physical freedom).
223. See Acton, 15 U.S. at 654 (explaining that children must depend on their parents
to exercise their rights for them); see also In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 225 (noting
that Lozano’s petition sought for his daughter to be returned to the United Kingdom’s
jurisdiction so that he could begin custody proceedings).
224. See id. (adding that this includes the right to nurture and care for one’s children).
225. See Stranko, supra note 24, at 31 (reaffirming that ICARA and the Hague
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children is associated with the well-recognized right to privacy, which
extends to matters of the home such as child rearing.226 Lacking a
compelling interest by the state, individuals are free to make personal
decisions relating to marriage and family relationships without unjustified
government interference.227
The Court in Lozano suggests that protecting an abducted child’s best
interests constitutes a compelling interest that justifies violating the non-
abducting parent’s fundamental right to raise his or her child.228 The
possibility that a child’s best interests could be overlooked in a single case is
not a compelling government interest that outweighs a custodial parent’s
substantive and procedural due process rights.229
The Supreme Court’s reliance on judicial discretion highlights the risk of
not applying equitable tolling to ICARA’s one-year filing deadline, as the
respondent was granted an affirmative defense despite concealing the child
in order to exploit ICARA’s provisions.230 With no viable grave risk of harm
defense, the Lozano court’s decision not to apply equitable tolling to the one-
year filing period effectively rewards the respondent for purposefully
concealing her daughter for sixteen months.231 By such standards, the
respondent could have lost only if she had been particularly unskilled at
hiding her child.232 The Court’s exercise of its discretion in this matter
prevented Lozano from being able to effectively exercise his procedural and
substantive due process rights.233
Convention address jurisdictional issues rather than custodial issues).
226. See Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (elaborating that
privacy rights also extend to matters of family, marriage, motherhood, and procreation).
227. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (requiring
regulations to be narrowly drawn to address compelling state interests).
228. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1235 (2014) (lamenting that
equitable tolling could uproot children who have settled in their new environment,
resulting in harm).
229. See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1359 (M.D. Fla.
2002) (detailing respondent’s efforts to conceal her children, and the danger of allowing
her to benefit from these actions through a now-settled defense).
230. SeeMathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (noting the second factor of
a due process consideration, which examines the risk of depriving an individual of a
private interest through the procedures proscribed by statute).
231. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1231 (noting that the district court found evidence of
stability in the child’s family, educational, social, and home life in New York).
232. SeeWigley v. Hares, 82 So. 3d 932, 942 (Fla. App. 2011) (rejecting a now-settled
defense because the respondent purposely kept the child out of community activities to
keep him concealed).
233. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1236 (concluding that the Court of Appeals had rightly
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The Supreme Court in Lozano further erred by refusing to recognize
ICARA as a federal statute in its own right.234 Congress modified ICARA
to make it more accurately reflect American legal principles and traditions.235
Stressing the need for a uniform international interpretation of the
Convention ignores the fact that equitable tolling would not replace any part
of the Convention.236 Even though Congress did not explicitly state that
equitable tolling should be read into the one-year filing period, the Supreme
Court has previously found it necessary to read equitable tolling into statutes
rather than risk barring valid claims.237 The Supreme Court in Lozano should
have automatically applied equitable tolling to the one-year filing deadline
just as they would with any other federal statute.238 By failing to read
equitable tolling into ICARA, the Supreme Court effectively deprived
Lozano of his parental rights by ensuring that his daughter would continue
to receive her education and medical care in a completely different country
without his input.239
The Court fails to realize that abducting parents who conceal their children
are counting on a petitioner’s claim to become stale in order to create the
opportunity to raise affirmative defenses.240 After one year has passed,
petitioners lose the ability to automatically reclaim their parental rights, and
are instead reliant upon the discretion of the court.241 Because the
decided that the Hague Convention was not subject to equitable tolling and rejecting
Lozano’s petition for the return of his child to the United Kingdom).
234. See id. at 1232 (attempting to distinguish ICARA from other federal statutes).
235. See id. at 1233 (stating that ICARA was irrelevant to the discussion on equitable
tolling because it does not exist to alter the Hague Convention).
236. See id. at 1233-34 (reasoning that adding provisions to ICARA would negatively
affect the Convention’s goal of uniformity).
237. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (declining to reject equitable tolling
just because the text of the statute was silent on the matter); see also Mendez Lynch v.
Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (citing Ellis v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 1998)) (reasoning that equitable
tolling should be read into every federal statute of limitations unless Congress states
otherwise).
238. See Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (considering the one-year filing
deadline to be a statute of limitations and applying equitable tolling).
239. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1231 (detailing the child’s entrance into school and
therapy in New York).
240. See Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (2008) (cautioning courts about
rewarding abductors for concealing the whereabouts of their children long enough to
establish a now-settled defense).
241. See Trotter, supra note 2 at 8 (emphasizing the difference between an absolute
and permissive obligation; once a year has passed, the return obligation becomes
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government has not formally put forth a compelling interest to deny custodial
parents their fundamental rights to raise their children, it is unacceptable not
to consider the one-year filing deadline as a statute of limitations to protect
parents’ ability to fight for their fundamental rights.242
Lozano did not “sleep on his rights” and wait to look for his daughter until
after a year had passed; he spent over sixteen months searching for his child,
whom the respondent concealed in another country.243 Concealment effects
a petitioner’s likelihood that she will be able to recover his or her child and
resume parental duties.244 Failing to equitably toll the filing period to
account for this concealment unfairly punishes petitioners and rewards
respondents who actively seek to avoid liability for their actions.245 If not
for this concealment, Lozano would have filed a petition in a timely manner
and received an absolute return of his child in line with American due process
requirements.246 Instead, his case was left up to judicial discretion, the result
of which deprived him of his fundamental parental rights in violation of
substantive due process.247
The inability to make this distinction between cases in which parents are
negligent in filing petitions and those in which concealment prevents parents
from filing means that the Supreme Court in Lozano did not properly
consider which parent’s rights were in danger of being violated.248 While it
is true that the respondent built a stable life for her daughter in New York
and made decisions regarding her health and education, she had no right to
effectively sever the father’s rights by leaving him out of major domestic,
permissive and up to judicial discretion).
242. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (emphasizing that the
government must have a compelling interest to obstruct such a right).
243. SeeBelay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d 553, 563 (2003) (differentiating between
cases where an abducted child has been concealed and cases where a parent has neglected
to file a petition in time despite knowing their child’s location).
244. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1983) (holding that parents must
have had a prior relationship with their children to establish protected parental rights).
245. See Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570 (quoting Hague International Child Abduction
Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,505 (Mar. 26, 1986) (questioning the propriety of
rewarding abductors for concealing their children)).
246. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (noting that due process
requires the opportunity for a petition to be heard at a meaningful time).
247. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014) (concluding that
the Court of Appeals had rightly decided that the Hague Convention was not subject to
equitable tolling and upholding the respondent’s now-settled defense).
248. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257 (examining the relationship between parental rights
and parental obligations).
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medical and educational decisions.249 The respondent abused her custodial
rights at the expense of the petitioner’s, and was rewarded by the court for
her actions.250
The Supreme Court erred when it refused to apply equitable tolling to the
one-year filing period for Lozano’s ICARA petition.251 By favoring a child’s
potential best interests over the procedural and substantive due process rights
of the petitioner, the Supreme Court has set a dangerous precedent that
allows for unconstitutional violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and
disregards the narrow tailoring requirements of the strict scrutiny standard.252
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
If the United States wants to properly carry out the goals of the Convention
and protect parents’ procedural and substantive due process rights, it must
begin by acknowledging ICARA for what it truly is — a federal statute that
has already seen its share of modifications and added conditions, which
should be subject to traditional American legal traditions and assumptions.253
The one-year filing period should also be recognized as a statute of
limitations in its own right, as it marks the time during which a parent can
exercise their fundamental rights without question.254
Allowing the current precedent to stand effectively enables parent
abductors to abuse a system that was specifically created to deter their
wrongful actions.255 Rather than using proper legal channels to obtain sole
custody, parents are uprooting children from their homes and fleeing across
national borders to avoid both the parent who has been left behind and all the
249. See Vernonia Sch. Dis. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (acknowledging that
children have very few fundamental rights that they can exercise).
250. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that
Lozano exhausted all legal resources in the United Kingdom before beginning his search
in the United States and ultimately filing his petition).
251. See Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1235 (2014) (citing the child’s best interests as its
reason for refusing to grant Lozano’s petition).
252. See id. at 1236 (rejecting Lozano’s contention that the Hague Convention leaves
room for US courts to apply their own “common law doctrine of equitable tolling” to
Article 12’s one-year filing period).
253. See generally Trotter, supra note 2 (elaborating on the conditions added to
ICARA before it was codified into U.S. law, including language and financial
modification).
254. See generally Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the
one-year filing period was analogous to a statute of limitations).
255. See In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 228 (acknowledging that abducting parents
could be encouraged to conceal their children if equitable tolling is not applied to
ICARA’s filing deadline).
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legal consequences awaiting them in their home country.256 While there may
be regrettable instances where parents are taking their children and fleeing
abusive situations, many parents abduct their own children out of spite,
malice, and callous disregard for the other parent’s fundamental rights.257
Regardless of any international treaty, individuals who bring a case before
a U.S. court should be able to rely on the Constitution. The Fourteenth
Amendment protects parental rights for parents who have fulfilled their duty
to their children, as well as the procedural due process rights of all
individuals within the American legal system.258 In cases where there is no
viable grave risk of harm defense, a parent’s right to raise and nurture her
child should always trump an abductor’s right to conceal her children in
order to raise an affirmative defense and avoid litigation in her home
country.259
V. CONCLUSION
Refusing to apply equitable tolling is an unconstitutional violation of
procedural and substantive due process because it prevents custodial parents
from using the statutory processes afforded to them under ICARAwhen their
children are abducted or removed from the country and denies them their
fundamental parental rights.260 The Supreme Court must recognize the
similarities between a statute of limitations and ICARA’s one-year filing
period, and equitably toll this period in cases of concealment.261 Failure to
256. See generally Sherer, supra note 21 (noting the conditions of international child
abduction that led to the creation of ICARA and the Hague Convention).
257. See Rivers, supra note 22 at 591 (emphasizing the difficulty in obtaining
effective assistance from foreign authorities and other hurdles faced by custodial parents
of abducted children).
258. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (establishing that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
259. See generally See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (finding
child reading to be a fundamental right that falls under one’s constitutionally guaranteed
right to privacy).
260. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 632 (2010) (determining that timeliness
is always determined under equitable principles and holding that equitable tolling does
not undermine a statute’s purpose of eliminating delays). See generally Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (identifying three factors that determine when process is
due and elaborating that a fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner).
261. See generally Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d 553, 261 (2003) (concluding
that the abducting parent would not be allowed to benefit from the “protective sweep” of
Article 12 and rejecting her now-settled defense since she concealed her child’s
whereabouts from the petitioner).
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do so violates the fundamental parental rights that the Court has recognized
for decades.262 Furthermore, the Court should recognize that its holding in
Lozano v. Montoya Alvarezwas in error, and decline to follow it as precedent
in future ICARA cases.263
262. See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects parental rights).
263. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (emphasizing that the
government must have a compelling interest in order to obstruct such a fundamental
right); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (requiring regulations to be
narrowly drawn to address compelling state interests).
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